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C. 0. OKIDI*

The State and the Management of
International Drainage Basins in
Africa**
INTRODUCTION
Rivers or lakes are considered to be international if their surface settings
traverse the territories of two or more states. In the case of a river it may
form whole or part of the boundary of two or more states; alternatively,
it may flow successively, through two or more states; some situations
present a combination of both. In the case of a lake, it may actually be
shared by two or more states. Thus, rivers or lakes as such are distinguishable from the concept of drainage basin, where the latter is broader,
constituting the entire catchment area which contributes both, the surface
and groundwater towards a common terminus.
There are about 54 international rivers and lakes in Africa. Out of that
total, 11 drain the territories of four or more states, with the largest
number of states drained by any one river being ten. Nineteen basins
drain areas more than 100,000 square kilometers, and in all, the area
drained by these international rivers and lakes is about half of the total
areas of the continent.' That, certainly, is considerable reticulation of
water systems in this vast continent.
There have been attempts to organize the basin states towards the
management of the water systems. The current institutions for such purposes include: Niger Basin Authority (NBA); Organization for the Management of Senegal Basin (OMVS); Organization for the Management
of Gambia Basin (OMVG); Kagera Basin Organization (KBO); Chad
Basin Commission (CBO); and the Permanent Joint Technical Committee
(PJTC), between Egypt and Sudan on the Nile Waters. Currently, the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), under its programme
for environmentally sound management of inland waters (EMINWA) is
initiating an integrated regional development programme for the Zambezi
River, later to be followed by Lake Tanganyika.
The purpose of this paper is not to review the management regimes of
*Research Associate Professor, Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Nairobi,
Kenya.
**Views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They do not have official standing as
such.
I. Data have been gleaned from the records at the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa (UNECA). For a summary see UNECA, Problems of Water Resources in Africa. Doc. No.
E/CN. 13/NRD/WR/Rev. 2, 49 (Oct. 21, 1976)) (Addis Ababa).
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these organizations. Rather, this paper will examine some of the macropolicy questions of state involvement in actual management and utilization
of the waters of any basin in Africa. The paper will take up selected
issues and concepts and point to experiences with the utilization of river
waters for the promotion of socioeconomic goals at national or regional
levels. In other words, the paper takes the position that whether the
management and utilization of the water is done within a national or
regional framework, the role of the state will evince certain common
conditions and the net results are similar when looked at from the perspective of promotion of socioeconomic well-being of the human population.
To set the stage for the discussion, the paper will begin with a brief
outline of the significance or justification of the management of water
resources on a basin-wide basis. Secondly, it will outline some of the
justifications for state involvement in the management of such basin
waters. In the process, we should see some of the salient activities which
the state is to be expected to perform. Thirdly, despite the imperatives
of state involvement, there are a number of drawbacks in the state performing the roles; the next part of the paper is intended to outline some
of such caveats, posed as criticisms. It is expected that the discussion
should automatically suggest the limitations or caveats to state involvement in the management. Such caveats should by themselves suggest
themes for social scientific research on improving efficiency of managing
drainage basins.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BASIN-WIDE MANAGEMENT
The area of Africa which is covered by the reticulation of rivers and
lake basins, as mentioned above, is about one half of the total area of
the continent. But in discussing the rivers and lakes, implicitly, the factor
of interest is actually water which they carry and consequently what could
actually be done with the available volumes of water in the pursuit of
development goals. That point, in turn, leads us to some of the most
critical socioeconomic policy questions which Africa has faced in recent
times, particularly since the early 1970s, which might have been alleviated
by proper management of water resources.
Ordinarily, community water supply for the safeguard of public health
is considered the most pervasive socioeconomic use of water. Some might
mention also the use of water in industries and even water transport; all
these can benefit from availability of bodies of water in Africa.
But in actual fact two of the most critical uses of water that have
relevance for the problems of the 1970s and '80s is in agriculture for
food production and hydroelectric power generation. These are the two
most dreaded problems of African economic development and growth in
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the last decade and a half. Drought (defined as absence of rain water) is
considered in general officialdom as having led to devastating famines
and loss of human and animal lives in Africa in the 1980s. No single
problem has ever mobilized equal amounts of international attention towards Africa, since colonization, as the emergency operation to deal with
famine. The underlying supposition is that Africa has not had enough
water for agricultural food production. 2
The second critical problem for the majority of African countries during
that period is low production of indigenous energy where most of them
have relied heavily on hydrocarbons. It is maintained that the second
villain in the poor performance of African economies has been the prices
of the hydrocarbons which were increased by members of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), since the so-called oil embargo which commenced in 1973. The basic argument in that context is
that the countries relied principally on the expensively imported hydrocarbons to fuel their industries, transportation, and domestic/urban operations.
Surely, the two problems could impede operation of the economies of
African countries, if there were, indeed, no alternatives to evenly distributed rainfall, and sources of energy other than hydrocarbons. But is
that firmly the case? The volume of surface water available is readily
suggested by the reticulation of rivers and lakes as discussed above. The
estimates of the actual volume cannot be precise. However, K.V. Krishnamurthy, who worked for U.N. Economic Commission for Africa in the
water resources matters, has offered the following suggestive data:
Estimates of Africa's total water resources vary from 3,400 billion
m3 of water to 4,600 billion M 3 .An analysis of the measured streamflow in African rivers indicates that the total quantity of surface water
in Africa's rivers and lakes is in order of 2,480 billion m 3, the
difference between this and the aforementioned estimates being a
measure of groundwater resources. More than 50 percent of the total
water resources of the continent are in one single river basin, Congo/
Zaire basin (1,325 billion) and another 25 percent in seven other
river basins such as Niger (200 billion), the Ogooue (149 billion in
Gabon), the Zambezi (104 at C. Ana), the Nile (84 billion), the
Sanage (Cameroon, 165 billion), the Chari-Logone (Chad, 43 billion)
and the Volta (40 billion)?
2. This is eloquently expressed by Professor Adebayo Adedeji, the Executive Secretary of UN
Economic Commission for Africa and Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General
on the African Economic Crisis in his "End-of-the-Year Conference on Africa's Current Economic
Crisis and the Prospects for 1985" issued at his Addis Ababa Office on Dec. 28, 1984 where he
singled out "Drought and Emergency Situation" as the dominant problems, in a list which also
included unfavorable global economic environment and the dramatic increase in Africa's external
debt.
3. See K.V. Krishnamurthy, The Challenge of Africa's Water Development, I Nat. Res. F. 369,
371 (1977).
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The study adds in the same page that the actual total water utilization
in Africa was about 90 billion m3 , which represents about only two percent
of the surface and groundwater resources in the continent. That is to say,
about 95 to 98 percent of the African water resources is at present flowing
only to replenish the ocean waters, but not put to any productive use by
Africa. Non-hydrologists might not clearly imagine the magnitude involved, but Krishnamurthy, as a hydrologist, concludes that this is a
colossal under-utilization of Africa's water resources and calls for immediate redress.4 One must conclude, indeed, that the problem for Africa
is not scarcity of water resources. Abundant water may only be said to
be unevenly distributed by seasons and locations. To use it in agriculture
dependably would seem to require flow control and redistribution.
How about hydroelectric power as a source of energy in Africa? Again
Krishnamurthy5 reports that in relative terms, one third of the world's
potential hydropower is in Africa and that the per capita potential in
Africa is more than three times the world average. He adds that despite
that high potential, the installed capacity of hydroelectric power in Africa
is only 5.6 percent of the total, and that the ratio of energy generation
to the exploitable potential is only 2 percent. The relative figures are
indicated in Table 1.
Even though the data in Table I are only subject to detailed appreciation
by an engineer, the point is made that while Africa has a large share of
the world total hydroelectric power it is using very little of it, having
installed only 5.6 percent. And this power, which is indigenous to the
continent, might in fact be less costly than the energy from hydrocarbons.
The task for Africa may be to consider hydroelectric power generation
as an integral part, if not in fact, the incentive for multipurpose water
resources development in Africa. And it is conceivable that the hydropower might enhance the use of the water resources in agriculture in
order to get Africa towards socioeconomic normalcy.
Returning to the subject of water and agricultural productivity: It should
be clarified that apart from water, land is indispensable for agricultural
productivity. The question might be asked whether Africa perhaps has
sufficient cultivable land, even if it has the water. Not so: Professor Odero4. Note, however, that more than three quarters of the total rainfall in Africa is immediately lost
through evaporation, a fact which might be significant in designing water conservation projects. See
Doc. No. E/ Doc. No. E/CN. 14/NRD/WR.2/Rev. 2 (1976), see Table I at page 649. Note further
that the knowledge of Africa's groundwater reserves is not complete, as directed by some recent
discoveries. Perhaps the most dramatic discovery is that of the lake under the Sahara Desert, which
Libya is planning to exploit at the rate of 6 million m' per-day. See a feature story in The Sunday
Times (Nairobi), Dec. 22, 1985 at 4, col. 3. At the same time, Egypt under the late President Sadat
had already embarked on plans to expand desert agriculture by 500,000 acres, using waters of the
underground lake. See, Egypt's Desert of Promise, 161 National Geographic 190 (Feb. 1982). If

there are any connections between the two aquifers then the two states might one day want to talk
about jointly planned utilization of the water from the reservoir.
5. Krishnamurthy at 370 (cited in note 3).
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TABLE I
Africa's share
of the
world total
(%)

Item
Africa
World
I. Potential hidro capacity (MW)
200,000
565,000
35.4
Installed capacity (MW) 1974
9,050
340,000
2.7
11,250
(MW) 1975
2. Percentage of installed to potential
5.6
hydro capacity (1975)
3. Hydro-potential
(billion of kWh) (theoretical)
2,690
6,540
41.0
(exploitable)
1,630
5,000
33.0
4. Hydropower generation in 1974
(billion of kWh)
34
1,433
2.4
5. Percentage of generation to the
exploitable potential
2
30
7.0
Source: UNECA Problems of Water Resources Development in Africa E/CN. 14/NRDWR/2/Rev. 2
at 28 (1976).

Ogwell, 6 then Secretary to the United Nations World Food Council, wrote
in 1982 that Africa's agricultural land potential is immense and that land
was certainly not a constraint. That Africa's potential compares favorably
with other regions, he says, is suggested by Table 2. 7
If both water and land are actually available within the continent then
the constraint to agricultural productivity (leading, in large measure, to

the crisis) must lie elsewhere. In the paper under reference, Professor
TABLE 2

Region

Potentially
cultivable
(m ha)

Presently
cultivated
arable
area
(m ha)

Presently
cultivated
(%)

Average
period
(yrs)

Africa
Southwest Asia
Southeast Asia
South America

803.7
46.0
324.8
814.9

193.7
50.9
270.5
85.2

24
110
83
10

3
2
3
4

6. L.A. Odero-Ogwell, The African Food Problem and the Challenge to the International Community (mimeo, 1982).
7. Id., Table 3 at 7. Explanatory notes offered stated that the average fallow periods are a very
general estimate for fallow period required for one year cultivation (low inputs). The figures for
South America were only provisional. The percentage for the presently cultivated period is higher
than 100 implying that land which is not suitable for cultivation has already been encroached on.
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Odero-Ogwell points to the failure to adopt technological packages in
agriculture as one of the bottlenecks. One instance which he raises is that
in Africa in 1977, only 1.8 percent of the cultivated land was irrigated,
compared to 28 percent in Asia and 6.1 percent in Latin America.'
This, in fact, may point to one of Africa's critical problems in agricultural productivity: There is plenty of water and land but it is all unevenly distributed and the water is not managed, controlled and transferred
to the appropriate land for agricultural productivity. Although other factors
such as trained manpower, implements, and fertilizers may also be lacking
in the African agriculture (discussed later in this paper) failure to manage
and control water, already demonstrated to be available in large quantities,
is clearly a central constraint. Therefore, the necessity for the management
and control of water resources in the lakes and rivers in Africa seems
well demonstrated.
Both use of water for irrigation and hydroelectric power generation
require control of the river water through damming; they require change
in the flow regime. But while harnessing the river water for hydropower
changes only the flow regime of the river, abstraction of the river or lake
water for purposes of irrigation reduces the quantities. Indeed, irrigation
is the most voracious of all quantitative uses of water resources.
Change of the flow regime alone may mean that the water does not
reach the lower riparians in the quantities and at the same time as under
the natural flow regime, but that the same volume of water finally gets
there. Thus, this may offer only a limited basis for complaint by a lower
riparian, against an upper one, provided that it can be demonstrated that
the natural flow regime is restored by the point where the river enters the
territory of the lower one. 9 Thus, a complaint or a claim may be legitimate
if the flow is disrupted to the detriment of existing use of water in the
lower riparian.
On the other hand, irrigation will of necessity diminish the quantity
of water reaching the lower riparian. For ongoing projects in the lower
riparian states, the consequences of a sudden interruption in the quantity
of water could be disastrous. But it may also be fatal for any planned
projects.
In any case, damming of a river usually has consequences even for
the upper riparian states. The most notorious problem is the backwater
effect resulting in the displacement and resettlement of population residents within certain reaches of the river. Examples of this problem are
8. Odero-Ogwell at 6 (cited in note 6).
9. In"Lake Lanoux" Arbitration, the Tribunal rejected the claim by Spain that the French's mere
diversion of the Carol River water and restoring it without consumption, constituted breach of the
Spanish interests. See "Lake Lanoux" Arbitration in 12 UNRIAA 218, also reprinted in 53 Am. J.
Int'l L. 156 (1959).
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legion, but one of the better known instances was the construction of the
High Aswan Dam which, with a height of 100 meters, was to extend to
nearly 700 kilometers southwards, with 250 kilometers out of that being
in Sudanese territory and affecting the settlement at Wadi Halfa. Fortunately, there was a longstanding framework of consultation available
between the two countries, within which they could resolve the issue.
More recently the backwater effect of the proposed Rusumo Dam on
the Kagera River led to tough negotiations among the members of Kagera
Basin Organization (KBO) because of its anticipated impact on the settled
areas in the densely populated Rwanda and Burundi. The elevation of
the dam would be in direct proportion to possible hydropower production
at other sites such as Kakono and Kishanda, apart from the high power
production at Rusumo itself. But the point is illustrated by showing the
various proposed elevations at Rusumo and the possible power production
there, as juxtaposed against the areas of the territories to be submerged
by the dam and the population to be displaced (Tables 3 to 5). 'o
A number of points are illustrated by the data in Tables 3 to 5: They
show that the power output is highest at the highest elevation at Rusumo,
TABLE 3
Variants of Power Linked to
Water Surface Elevation at Rusumo Dam

1. Rusumo 1345 metres
Kishanda
Kakono
Total
2. Rusumo 1335 metres
Kishanda
Kakono
Total
3. Rusumo 1325
Kishanda
Kakono
Total

Installed
power
(MW)

Guaranteed
output
(GWh/year)

Inter-annual
output
(GWh/year)

129
214
57

535
1,026
259

597
1,125
301

400

1,820

2,023

105
210
54

410
820
207

480
1,102
286

369

1,437

1,868

80
207
53

270
500
126

374
1,082
277

340

896

1,733

10. Data derived from Hydropower Development of Rusumo Falls: G-Economic Summary and
Conclusions (Tractionel-Electrobel Studies) at 6-8 (June 1979); 3 Development Programme of the
Kagera Basin: Final Report; Energy 38 (Kagera Basin Organization and UNDP (Feb. 1982)).
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TABLE 4
Land Areas Likely to be Submerged
by the Dam at Different Levels'
Water
level

Total surface area submerged2
Rwanda

Burundi

Usable surface area submerged

Total'

Rwanda

Burundi

1345
52,000 ha
11,000 ha
63,000 ha
t7,240 ha
5,600 ha
1335
33,000 ha
9,000 ha
42,000 ha
8,180 ha
3,210 ha
1325
20,500 ha
6,000 ha
26,500 ha
2,510 ha
1,220 ha
'These areas correspond to the normal water levels plus an additional 3m.
2
Not including permanent areas of water (lakes, ponds) already existing.
'The area to be submerged is not included in these figures.

Total
22,8'0 ha
11,390 ha
3,730 ha

TABLE 5
The Number of People to be Moved and Resettled
as a Consequence of Backwater at Different Elevations
Water
level
1345
1335
1325

Rwanda

Number of inhabitants affected
Burundi

Total

22,975
10,445
2,220

2,975
1,610
535

25,950
12,055
2,755

which is 1345 meters, for all the proposed sites. The converse is true at
the lowest elevation which is 1325 meters. Correspondingly, the higher
the level of the dam, the larger the backwater effect. Therefore, the
submerged area of land in Rwanda and Burundi with the additional consequence that the number of people to be displaced is 25,950 and 2,755
for 1345 meters and 1325 meters, respectively. That is the balance of
opportunity costs for the hydropower to be produced, plus use of the
waters of the dam for irrigation, as against social disruption and relocation.
Given the high population density in the two countries the vehement
objection to the higher levels of the dam was understandable. In fact, the
controversy threatened the very continuity of the Kagera Basin joint
programmes. Fortunately, there was already the framework of consultation set up in KBO for the basin-wide management. On May 9, 1981,
the Heads of State of the KBO member states resolved the controversy
and opted for the minimum dam which would create a reservoir at a
normal operating water level of 1325 meters.
The Rusumo issue also illustrates the fact that one dam can alter the
flow regime and have considerable impact on the power potentials of
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other possible damsites within the river basin, and at significant distances,
as are Rusumo, Kishanda and Kakono. Thus, the reasons for a basinwide management are clearly numerous and compelling.
JUSTIFICATION FOR STATE INVOLVEMENT
The discussion of the significance of basin-wide management of rivers
and lakes will have suggested some aspects of the justification for state
involvement in the operations. In this section, the justification will be
discussed in terms of the functional rationale, thereby, analysing some
of the problems which necessitate state involvement. The role of the state
will, therefore, become apparent.
The breakdown of the items justifying state involvement shows considerable analytic overlaps; at the same time, the items are susceptible
to different levels of specificity and inter-relationship. Here, six broad
items are found distinguishable.
Treaty Requirements in International Waters
It has been argued above that the regulation of flow regimes within a
river, out of a lake or abstraction of waters for consumptive uses are
likely to have substantial physical and socioeconomic consequences for
both the upper and lower riparians. Yet, the data shows the unused water
resources and their potentials in Africa to be enormous. In fact, it is
manifestly wasteful that African states have not taken measures towards
complete utilization of the waters for, inter alia, irrigated agriculture,
hydroelectric power production and navigation through flow regulation
and management.
Therefore, it is clear that the African States should undertake regulations and management of the waters of national and international rivers
and lakes. It is also evident that the management should be done on a
basin-wide basis.
The foregoing two attributes require regional inter-state collaboration,
coinciding with the scope of the basin, as a prerequisite. In that context,
a regional agreement setting out the precise framework of reciprocal
expectations and the protocol for implementation as accepted among the
basin states, is a prerequisite. It is only the states that would adopt such
treaties in accordance with the national constitutions, and as a function
of the sovereign."
II. Note that some national constitutions permit constituent provinces/states of the sovereign
state, to enter into treaties in the specified subject areas. An example in point is the Convention on
the Protection of Lake Constance against Pollution, signed by the Land of Baden-Wurttenberg, the
Free State of Bavaria, the Republic of Austria and the Swiss Confederation, Oct. 27, 1960, where
the first two are constituent states of the Federal Republic of Germany. The text is reproduced in
the United Nations Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER. B/12, at 438 (1963).
The Convention entered into force in Nov. 10, 1961.
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There are instances where the appropriateness of a formal treaty becomes an acute problem even if international co-operation is unquestionably necessary. Say, for instance, if the Gaborone Dam, which feeds the
capital of Botswana, was to carry so much water that it caused backwater effect flooding the territory of South Africa (and if the latter was
to argue that the flooded territory is actually part of Bophuthatswana, a
bantustan not recognized as a foreign state, by Botswana), the City of
Gaborone, as a legal personality might find it appropriate to discuss the
matter with anyone. But the Government of Botswana might find that
discourse to be politically embarrassing and unacceptable considering that
the so-called independent homeland concept is unacceptable to the UN
and OAU. Yet for reasons of viability of the city, its inhabitants and
industries, a solution would have to be found. Clearly, only the state can
resolve the problem, as a fundamental national issue.
The treaty framework is easier to create before there is a dispute, and
disputes are likely to arise once utilization of the waters begin. Once a
dispute arises over water uses it is possible for it to end on a war footing,
as was suggested by the late President Sadat with respect to the proposed
use of waters of the Blue Nile by Ethiopia. In May 1978, the late President
was reported to have said that Egypt would not accept any interference
with the flow of the water of the Blue Nile, particularly if in its view
Ethiopia took such a measure for political reasons. 2 Yet, it is very difficult
to ascertain that the motives for any Ethiopian construction is political
and not based on vital socioeconomic necessity. Hopes for peaceful negotiation between Egypt and Ethiopia were raised only when the Heads
of the two states issued a Joint Communique in Cairo on April 9, 1987.
They accepted that as the Nile basin countries, they would promote
cooperation, particularly in the field of rational utilization of the waters
of the Nile to the benefit of their two peoples and all peoples of the area.
Creating a treaty framework is, therefore, a central role of the state and,
given the necessity for water management one which should probably be
done for every international river or lake in Africa today.
The Nature of Water Laws in Different States
As pointed out already, the central factor in the rivers and lakes management is water. Whether the river or lake is national or international
in character, the issue is utilization of the waters by public or private
entities within the nation states and such would necessarily be governed
by the national laws, which laws may be prescribed and enforced only
by the national authorities, according to their respective constitutions.
12. For further discussions, see Okidi, Legal and Policy Regime of Lake Victoria and Nile Basins,
20 Indian J. Int'l L. 394, 440 (1980).
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There is considerable diversity in the water laws of various African
countries, as determined by their juridico-political histories. 3 Countries
in Africa include those following civil law or common law and associated
jurisprudence. But there are also those countries whose laws are influenced by Islamic jurisprudence. Yet a further category is where the original
tribal laws existing prior to colonization have co-existed with the European-derived legal systems. And these legal systems exist in Africa today;
at times more than one variant in the same country.
It is sufficient only to point out here that the various legal systems
make distinction in matters of ownership and right to use water. For
instance, the common law doctrines arising from the English tradition
acknowledge only usufructuary right in running water and they generally
adhere to the rule of prior appropriation as the governing principle among
users. Ownership of riparian lands only permits a right to use public water
and to allow it to flow continuously, but not ownership of the water which
actually rests in the state. Under civil law traditions, water which comes
under the public domain belongs to the public and may not be privately
appropriated. But the governing principle is the doctrine of riparian rights
which requires interests of all riparians to be protected. Thus, while the
doctrine of prior appropriation vests priority in terms of first in time, first
in right, the riparian rights principle requires equitable consideration of
the fights of all the riparians.
In any event, it seems evident that because of the differences which
might arise from the basic doctrines on water ownership or user rights,
the state would have a role in the harmonization of the intensified consumptive usage, such as for irrigation or flow regulation to facilitate
hydropower production, navigation and use in industries. It seems, moreover, that in each of these legal systems the state has a central role in
the regulation and control of use of water as a public resource. Only the
state through its laws would properly provide the framework for regulation
and apportionment of water among the various contending public and
private users.
Regulation Necessitated by Broad Base of Water Projects
Water by its very nature is a pervasive substance; projects involving
its utilization such as community consumption, irrigation, navigation,
and hydropower production tend to have multiple socioeconomic implications. Very often, those affected might not individually have enough
political or economic power to alter the course of events affecting them.
For instance, damming for hydropower production or to facilitate grav13. D.A. Caponera, ed., Water Law in Selected African Countries, (Rome, FAO, 1979); Caponera, Water Law in Moslem Countries (Rome, FAO, 1973).
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itational transfer of water for irrigation or to facilitate navigation may
each present an opportunity for the other socioeconomic activities. Concurrently, as seen in the case of Rusumo Dam, it may lead to loss of
agricultural land and the displacement of population, sometimes in high
population density countries, as in Rwanda.
These become socially or economically sensitive affairs which must
require the intervention of the political arm of the state. Moreover, even
if no detrimental effect is anticipated or created, the very decision to dam
a river, for instance, creates opportunities for other positive socioeconomic purposes which an individual might not cherish but which a state
might not want to waste. For instance, a decision by a private individual
(actual or juridical) to dam a river and use the water for irrigation may
create an opportunity for hydropower generation which only the national
energy planners may appreciate and only the state can be in a position
to coordinate the opportunities.
The Magnitude of Resource Involved
The necessity for a comprehensive and basin-wide management of the
waters of a basin seems evident from the foregoing analysis. At the very
least, the management should be planned on a basin-wide basis even if
the actual implementation is taken in stages. That entails meeting the cost
of the studies and eventually for the projects. These can be enormous,
and considering the nature of the river or lake basin plans, such costs
must fall on the state.
The magnitude of the resources may be illustrated by a couple of
instances. The member states of KBO have attempted the ideal comprehensive planning to include studies and implementation of projects in
energy, agriculture, transportation, afforestation and health. The total cost
is summarized in Table 6.
The total amount, nearly US$ 3.2 billion, is evidently an enormous
amount, even though one might suggest that it could be reduced by less
involvement of the state in the implementation of some of the sectors
such as agriculture, particularly the rainfed variation, under the drainage
basin programme.
Nevertheless the amount is bound to remain large even in instances
where the primary focus is in the construction of the dams but before the
infrastructure for hydroelectric power or irrigation are included. In the
case of OMVS, the primary plans are for the construction of the Diama
and Manantali Dams. By mid-1982, the OMVS was able to raise a total
of US$ 821,816,000, of which US$ 156,362,000 was for Diama and
US$ 572,319,000 for Manantali, while US$ 93,135,000 was earmarked
as reserve.
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TABLE 6
Summary of the Total Costs of the KBO Programmes
Studies
Energy
Railway
Roads: Primary
Secondary
Industries

$19,107,000
8,586,000
28,525,200
12,979,200
180,000

SUB-TOTAL

$69,377,400

Projects

Agriculture: Rainfed
Irrigated
Energy: Dams
Transmission lines
Railway: Construction of network
Rolling stock:
Roads: Primary
Secondary
Afforestation
Tse-tse fly

$

21,200,000
53,361,000
575,200,000
93,240,000
1,395,663,000
556,704,000
327,792,000
81,120,000
17,207,700
2,511,735

SUB-TOTAL FOR PROJECTS:

$3,120,999,435

TOTAL COST OF THE PROGRAMME

$3,190,376,835

Source: Development Programme of the Kagera Basin: Final Report Executive Summary, 73 (Kagera
Basin Organization and United Nations Development Programme, Feb. 1982).

The above total amount actually represented only 99 percent of the
cost of the two dams and the immediately related works. Clearly, then,
the total amount is just over one billion dollars; add to that the interest
on the loans and the total amount in 1988 could be considerably higher.
The point is that the investment requirements can be enormous if
integrated and basin-wide management is to be undertaken. And since
most of the investment includes studies and basic infrastructure on which
subsequent diverse investments would rely, only the state is in a position
to undertake them. That applies to international and, basically, national
management programmes.
Establishment and Development of Basin Institutions
Management of water resources as described above requires institutional bases far in excess of what a nation's private sector or non-gov-
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ernmental organizations can provide. It requires high level and diversified
management capabilities backed by research and institutional infrastructure-to ensure adoption and diffusion of appropriate technology and
improved husbandry. A keen observer of the African scene, Professor
Odero-Ogwell, has submitted that of all the regions of the world, Africa
has the lowest rate of adoption of technological packages in agriculture. 4
At the very foundation of institutional development is training of manpower, defined as the cadre of human beings capable of performing certain
productive functions. This is a costly and long undertaking which is to
be seen as promotion of the productive value of human resources whether
they are later to be deployed in the governmental or non-governmental
capacities. Very often, attempts to enhance the performance of a river or
lake basin development is hampered by lack of qualified manpower,
including agronomic researchers, engineers, managers or extensionists,
however one looks at the issue. In a study done by USAID and OMVS
for Integrated Development Project, it was observed from the outset that
the institutional and implementation problems which must be resolved
first, before positive results can be achieved, are:
1. The lack of resources and qualified personnel to carry out extension
activities;
2. The lack of logistical support for field agents;
3. A government directed approach to agricultural production encouraging the cultivation of specific crops (for example, rice) at the
expense of diversification;
4. The absence of monitoring systems for training and production
activities;
5. A lack of understanding of farmers' needs and their participatory
role in decision-making;
6. A lack of integration for farming activities, such as cattlebreeding
or herding. 5
These could arguably be called basic institutional questions which can
be properly dealt with by concerted action of the state, individually or
within a joint framework as was, indeed, discussed with OMVS in 1983. 6
And we can submit here that however vast the available financial resources
may be, there will be no success with the development programme unless
a competent and stable institutional framework is established.
14. Odero-Ogwell at 6 (cited in note 6). There are only a few exceptions to this tendency and
an example is the diffusion of hybrid maize seeds in Kenya which moved with amazing speed.
15. USAID/OMVS Integrated Development Project, Ill Analysis of the IDPTraining Component,
Project No. 685-0621 at 4 (1982).
16. See generally, an outline in OMVS, High Commission, Training and Human Promotion
Directorate (Dakar, 1983).
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Meeting the Requirements for Basic Infrastructure
Basic infrastructure to support the management of river or lake basins
include roads, railways, telecommunication facilities, laboratories, navigational support equipments, among others. They are generally akin to
the institutional requirements and their construction and establishment is
a proper domain of the state.
The state may, in fact, plan to establish the basic infrastructure and
later to use various devices of rent and taxation to recover part of its
investments from non-governmental or public commercial entities which
may enjoy the use of the infrastructure. In fact, the state should consider
as a serious option exempting only the essential social service institutions,
such as hospitals and community water supply points.

SOME CRITICISMS OF STATE PERFORMANCE
This section's principal purpose is to raise a number of caveats to state
involvement in the management of river or lake basins. In the process,
it may in fact point to other roles of the state not discussed above.
Moreover, most of the points raised below are interrelated; the breakdown
is designed for emphasis and analytic purposes. In their discussion, the
problems are being posed for research to ascertain ways of ameliorating
them and the promote effective management of African basins. The following illustrative points are raised:
Over-politicization of Institutions and Programmes
Involvement of the state in any matters is, ipsofacto, a political matter;
therefore, by actually accepting a state role in the management of river
or lake basins, the political role is automatically implied. The political
element, in fact, will be present in most of the points that can be raised
in this section.
The problem, however, arises when political consideratioris supercede
all else, in institutional and programme matters. Very particularly, the
over-politicization of the institutions commences with the determination
of personnel to be employed on the basis of political patronage to the
exclusion of merits and expertise. It is also possible that those who have
the expertise in the relevant areas may be made to understand that it is
not the professional qualifications that have earned them the jobs, but
they are proper clients of the patronizing politicians, or in the alternative,
plain nepotism. 7
17. In this case, the employee would be required to belong to Friends, Brothers or In-laws (FBI).
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The critical question here is one of a politicized appointment which is
subsequently backed by political protection of the employees. Its consequence is that the appointee is aware that it is the political, consanguineous or affinal loyalties and protection, and not excellence in professional
performance that will insure the job. Such are the persons who courageously resort to the misuse of office, unfair enrichment, misappropriation
of resources, and negligence of the assigned responsibilities. Very often,
the resources of the institution are squandered on unnecessary or unofficial
travels, including maintaining tight contact, or even performing political
duties for the patron politicians at home to the neglect of the assigned
headquarter duties. It may not be a surprise that in such cases, executives
of this kind will ignore or frustrate any assigned deputy, knowing only
too well that a deputy might be informed and able to reveal the irregular
practices if he has access to the official correspondence. This leads to
collapse of morale and apathy in the professional and support staff, with
fatal implications for the organization.
These characteristics often emerge in regional organizations, whether
they be drainage basin organizations or simply trade and service organizations where states are parties. Similarly, they are found in parastatals
at a national level. The executive officers act with impunity because they
understand that even if pressure had to result in their removal, they often
suffer no penalties for their offences against the community. To this the
exceptions are extremely rare.
In the case of the Niger Basin Authority (ABN) a great deal seems to
be concealed behind the reported criticism of its executive secretary by
the Council of Ministers meeting held at Niamey on August 10-11,
1984. s The eloquent understatement reported that the meeting decided
to create an ad hoc commission to evaluate the performance of "the
executive secretary not having fulfilled the expectations of the member
countries." It was nearly unanimously agreed that the poor performance
of the executive secretariat had undermined credibility of ABN vis-a-vis
the member states and the international financial institutions. As a consequence, financial contributions and donations were not forthcoming.
Perhaps a decisive and instructive action will be taken at the end of the
review, but again, this depends on the role which the states, particularly
that of the nationality of the executive secretary, decide to play in the
matter. It may, in fact, vindicate the thesis stated here by protecting the
official concerned.
The member governments of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern
and Southern African States (PTA) seemed to have evinced firmness and
18. International Rivers and Lakes at 12 (A newsletter by the DTCD, United Nations, New York,

No. 5. June 1985) has only a brief report on a Meeting of the Council of Ministers held at Niamey,
Niger, Aug. 10-1 I, 1984. These problems were evident for more than a year.
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prudent action, in one respect, on what may be called the "Spend thrift
Affair." The man who was appointed first secretary-general of the organization worked for only eleven weeks by which time a meeting of the
Council of Ministers was able to conclude that he "lacked the highest
standards of integrity, efficiency and technical competence expected of
him. .... "' Audit reports of the finances were also ordered, because part
of the accusations raised were that the secretary-general had conducted
himself contrary to the required standards of frugality, thriftiness and
prudence. But the action that might be taken in event of confirmed impropriety was not stated; he was summarily dismissed. But the pertinent
question must be, how was a person who evinces these characteristics
appointed to the job in the first place?
A more interesting and rare course of action seems to have been taken
by the states, members of the West African Economic Community (CEAO)
where three former officials were reportedly taken to court on trial on
charges of embezzlement of funds while they were in office. 2' They were
no political dwarfs: the main accused, Mohammed Diawara, a former
Ivorian Planning Minister, is alleged to have stolen the equivalent of US$
14 million belonging to CEAO, and shared with the Senegalese, who
was the organization's secretary-general, and a Malian. The three were
arrested in an exceptional event during the October 1984 summit at Bamako and sent to be kept in custody at the Burkinabe capital, which
houses CEAO headquarters, until the trials were to begin on March 25,
1986.
It is often expected that embezzlement of that magnitude is actually
encouraged by the alleged political patronage. And lessons from the
CEAO experience can be elucidated only by the knowledge of what
happened to the old patronage in each case.
One national level instance of a decidedly disastrous programme in
river basin management is the Bura Irrigation Scheme in Kenya. The
small programme conceived in early the 1970s to settle 60,000 people
(5,000 families) over an area of 6,700 hectares [ha.] was to be implemented with a consortium loan of US$ 91.7 million from the World Bank,
Dutch and the EEC."
On a surprise visit to the scheme on January 21, 1986 the President
of Kenya was riled by the scheme which he called a disgrace. He found
19. Report of the First Extraordinary Meeting of the PTA Council of Ministers, PTA/CM/XT
(Nov. 2, 1983).
20. The matter is attracting wide international publicity. See The Kenya Times, Mar. 17, 1986,
at 8, col. 3, and Mar. 25, at 8, col. 1.
21. See Overview by Barbara Gunnell, The Great Bura Irrigation Disaster, in African Business
18 (London) Magazine Editorial Comment (Apr. 1986). For the specific views of the President see
coverage in The Kenya Times, Jan. 22, 1986, at 1; and Jan. 28, 1986, at 9; and Feb. 18, 1986, at
4.
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eroded irrigation canals, abandoned plots, poor crops, tumbled down and
unsanitary housing, zebras grazing on irrigated land, and a general air
of desolation and decay. Some of the problems seem to have originated
from the inception of the programme. And the President ordered the
dismissal of the general manager, who was a political appointee, but it
took nearly fifteen years before that could be done. In any case, if some
of the problems were recognizable at the inception of the programme,
what happened to the purportedly rigorous World Bank pre-investment
appraisal machinery? Why did the Bank ride along with the disaster for
so long? Is it conceivable that a commercial or other form of non-governmental institution could have continued to pump the money in a venture
of that kind for nearly fifteen years but not the World Bank?
Tendency Toward Proliferation of Institutions
State activities tend to encourage proliferation of institutions even where
such institutions are parasitic on the resources of others. One functional
line which could be accomplished by an existing institution would often
be to have another institution set up for it, and this happens at national
and international levels alike.
On the question of irrigation, for instance, Kenya has about eight public
agencies involved. In many provinces there are National Irrigation Boards,
a development Authority, and Provincial Irrigation Unit, all at work.
Eventually, considerable resources are dissipated in administrative overhead costs rather than operational activities.
This is a general syndrome which is manifested with different intensities
in different regions. In central, eastern and southern Africa, there is the
PTA, which perhaps coincides, in part, with Lusaka-MULPOC, SADCC,
Gisenyi-MULPOC, Kagera Basin Organization, The Great Lakes Community, and the East African Development Bank. Then lately, there have
been arrangements to create a PTA "bank." It is highly questionable here
if all the MULPOCs are necessary for the development objectives. Similarly, the developmental value of the Great Lakes Community is questionable within the regional context. Having Rwanda and Burundi keep
Zaire company within the geo-political arrangement in the region might
not make much sense. But, evidently, Kagera Basin Organization is a
vital institution. Within the PTA context, one might suggest the use of
East African Development Bank, in an expanded form, as being more
appropriate and efficient than setting up a new PTA Bank in Bunjumbura.
Further considerations could be given to the use of existing institutions
in the region because expanding such institutions should be economically
cheaper and more efficient than setting up new ones.
In West Africa, a 1982 study mandated by the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa found that the major obstacle to integration in the
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ECOWAS region is the existence and varying objectives of a multiplicity
of intergovernmental organizations in the area.22 The study found that
there were more than 30 such organizations with some of the countries
belonging to more than 20: Senegal-20; Burkina Fasso (Upper Volta
at that time)-22; Niger-25. And there were 16 organizations on the
subject of natural resources management alone.
The effect is that the large share of the available resources goes to
servicing the permanent secretariats of organizations which have no resources left for developmental programmes. Very soon the states are
unable to justify continued use of taxpayers' money to service institutions
which have no development work to justify their existence.
Only states with taxation powers and limited accountability can proceed
with international institutions to that extent, especially if some of the
institutions are used only to reward political proteges, friends and relatives
of those in power, with lucrative salaries and benefits. African governments will want to be deliberate in keeping down the number of institutions and hopefully, the number of employees, to assure cost-effectiveness
in development matters.
Mix-up of Economic Exigencies with Political Prestige in Projects
All governments would wish to be powerful and carry some prestige
and ostentation around them, and within the state. It has been argued that
in a number of aid programmes, the goal has been for showy projects
which are conspicuous to the public, even if they are not the most socioeconomically logical ventures. The United States posed such an argument at the time of the construction of the Aswan Dam in Egypt and
Tanzania-Zambia railroad. The precise line is difficult to draw and the
argument is often dismissed as blatant prejudice. But perhaps in some
cases the argument may be verifiable and only caution should be raised
here.
In the case of OMVS some commentators have argued that it was not
necessary to construct two dams:23 The Manantali could have regulated
the flow of the water permitting year-round navigation, irrigation, hydropower production as well as to prevent salt water intrusion upstream.
They conclude that it was perhaps for the prestige of the Senegal, vis-avis Mali, that the Diama was to be constructed: The Manantali Dam is
on the territory of Mali; Senegal was to have one too, at Diama, for the
prestige of the respective states.
It is also argued that in its haste to construct the showy projects, the
states tend to overlook such socially vital matters as rigorous environ22. UNECA, Proposals for Strengthening Economic Integration in West Africa (Addis Ababa,
1984).

23. See Dangers of Haste on River Senegal Projects, West Africa 2083 (Oct. 23. 1978).
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mental impact assessment and the human aspects of the projects with the
clear consequence that the projects fail.24
An economic exigency which is often overlooked in the haste to construct the project is the cost of the capital borrowed for the project and
how it can be repaid. The Bura Irrigation Scheme is classical in this
regard. The total loan was US$ 91.7 million. But the President officially
declared the project "a disgrace, a failure and the height of mismanagement." He then concluded that the real losers are "the future generation
of Kenyans, who will go on paying the World Bank interest on the loan."
The haste is partly verified by the fact that even the soil quality is not
what was assumed at the beginning. Somehow the haste overwhelmed
the World Bank too, a fact which confirms that this problem could arise
anywhere. But it is not excusable.
The financial requirements for the OMVS and KBO are clear from the
section Magnitude of Resource Involved (discussed above). And if some
aspects of the projects be for political images, rather than meeting economic requirements (with the investment in social services being clearly
distinguished), the implications can be far reaching and perhaps only a
state, oblivious to canons of accountability, could proceed so recklessly.
Over-centralization of Institutions
This seems to be the one folly of state involvement in drainage basins
development with the most serious and far-reaching implications. Horror
stories seem to recur in most of the instances that have been surveyed in
Africa. The KBO, as a recent beginner, still awaits the stage of implementation and reviews to show if it departs from the existing trends.25
The OMVS as a development authority is going through the latest
attempt at implementation. But the earlier record of management of the
Senegal Basin underscores the folly with distinction. Accounts have been
given of the work of SAED, the parastatal authority in Senegal, responsible for organizing farmers and irrigation programmes in the Senegal
Valley. As recently as April 1975, there were meetings held with the
villagers' association for collective agriculture and visitors from the SAED
accompanied by French agricultural technicians.26
The evidence from the account is that the "experts" from SAED and
the villagers were strangers to one another; they were not effectively
24. See comments by Sophie Bassis, Recalculating River Development Cost: The Case of the
Senegal, CERES 21 (1982); and Adrian Adams, The Senegal River Valley: What Kind of Change?,
10 Rev. African Pol. Econ. 33 (1977).
25. Egypt and Sudan have not been covered in this study. They have the most extensive experience
in irrigation in Africa, while on the other hand, Su-Saharan Africa is just beginning.
26. Adrian Adams, The Senegal River Valley: What Kind of Change?, 10 Rev. African Pol.
Econ. 33 (1977).
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communicating and evidently the villagers did not fully understand what
SAED officials wanted nor were they interested in joining SAED because
the role of SAED had not been clearly explained to them.
The management was totally inefficient, to say the least. While the
original estimated cost was about US$ 13-14,000 per irrigated hectare,
the eventual cost averaged between US$ 40,000 and US$ 50,000 per
irrigated hectare. 2' This is in stark contrast to the reported cost in Mali,
where a World Bank project costs around US$ 26,000 per hectare, under
Sahelian conditions.
The condition in Bura was permitted to continue for about a decade.
And the pertinent question is whether it had to take a surprise helicopter
visit by the Head of State to change the trend. A summary of one of the
findings of the President was that:
The project managerial control was over centralized in Nairobi which
resulted in major weaknesses in the procurement of materials, delayed reaction to the crises on site, poor financial and budgetary
controls, and misapplication of project funds.2"
Finally, the President ordered that the project would, henceforth, be
managed from Bura.
This is important because the record of the National Irrigation Board
(NIB) suggested that very often the management was totally insensitive
to the woes of the farmers. Accounts from their West Kano project evinces
perils and helplessness. A settler at the scheme wrote to the press29 complaining against the NIB for increasing the costs to the farmers, while
paying less for the farmer's output and charging inflated prices for farm
inputs. In one paragraph he submits as follows:
Productivity has dropped. Morale is killed. The families affected
cannot dress. No education. The farmer no longer believes the scheme
was intended for his good. The NIB has become a reject, and it is
suspected to be more of a marketing agency for farm inputs and
equipment than a development agency. The NIB has impressed us
with its devotion to negligence and the skill to frustrate and demoralize farmers.'
That is a farmer's description of the performance of a parastatal agency
involved in a river basin development scheme at the national level.
27. These are figures given by Barbara Gunnell (cited in note 21); they might be on the higher
side but they do, nevertheless, underscore the point; estimates given in interviews with some NIB
officials put the figure between $33,000 and 40,000.
28. The Kenya Times, Feb. 18, 1986, at 9, col. 2.
29. See Sunday Nation (Nairobi), Nov. 28, 1982. For additional comments on the Fiasco in the
West Kano Scheme of the National Irrigation Board, see Sunday Nation, Nov. 14, 1982, Editorial.
30. Sunday Nation (Nairobi), Nov. 14, 1982, editorial.
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As Sub-Saharan Africa goes into river and lake basin development
schemes, there is need for close assessment of what is happening with
the schemes at the national level. Nigeria is one of the countries which
should offer lessons because it has eleven river basin authorities. One
indication seems clear, though, that the record of the Nigeria's National
Electric Power Authority (NEPA), which gets its power from, among
others, Kainji Dam, is not actually glamorous. Although Kainji has a
capacity of 760 megawatts, the production level is less than half of that.
Besides, indecisiveness kept the 700 megawatt gas-fired station at Sapele
from commissioning for over one year. 3 In the end, NEPA became associated with rather unflattering full titles as "Never Expect Power Always" or "Not Even Properly Administered."
It seems difficult to find a river or lake basin authority which has
effectively decentralized and devolved authority to local levels of their
regions in order to ensure effective implementation of projects through
an involvement of the supervisors in the actual work, sensitivity and
responsiveness to the needs of the farmers. The Lake Basin Development
Authority (LBDA) in Kenya accepts, in principle, that it should decentralize its project supervision and administration. However, the practice
is far from realization. By now, the LBDA has had just over two years
of actual and serious project implementation. It is expected that its decentralization programme should commence in practice during the third
year.
Apart from the follies of over-centralization outlined above the practice
also tends to assume that the local farmers are ignorant, irresponsible and
passive entities who should simply be directed by the imported "experts,"
like machines. Very little attempt is placed on the encouragement of local
initiatives and inventiveness by the local farmers. Nor do the over-centralized systems bother to mobilize local farmer organizations such as cooperatives, as the actual agents of development. These points come out
particularly in the 1975 SAED encounter discussed above. The specific
Senegal situation on the matter is elaborated by Thayer Scudder who says
that devolution to local levels is often correlated with higher yields and
that it increases the effectiveness of the responsible agencies.32
But devolution to the local levels and mobilization of producer organizations must, of necessity, be accompanied by a rigorous government
role in institution building (including training of experts and farmers) and
the provision of basic infrastructure. Granted, experience with co-operative organizations in Africa does not have many success stories to offer.
However, its history is short and so long as specific follies of state
31. See letter from Lagos by Eddie Iron in the African Business, at 12 (June 1984).
32. Thayer Scudder, African River Basins, Institute for Development Anthropology 37 (Binghamton, NY, 1981).
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involvement such as politicization and low level of accountability can be
remedied, there is some determination in Africa and examples from abroad
which suggest positive prospects."
CONCLUSIONS
The functional justification for state involvement in the management
of river and lake basins development in Africa inhere from the socioeconomic reasons for that very focus on development. It is further underscored by the established necessity for a comprehensive and integrated
approach to the management of the utilization of the water of the basin
for, inter alia, irrigated agriculture, hydroelectric power generation, navigation, and community and industrial uses of water. It is also a component
of integrated development planning that the state should ensure measures
to prevent negative environmental impact of the activities within individual basin states or in terms of trans-territorial environment injuries.
The study has outlined some negative practices associated with state
involvement in river and lake basin development. It is possible to indicate
factors that are most forcefully inimical to possible development: Politicization of the institutions and failure by the government to ensure
accountability by those who are in responsible positions. People who
know of their political protection tend to retain that as the focus of
commitment and to ignore pursuit of excellence in their work. Consequently, they resort to abuse of office, misappropriation, neglect of duties
and plain pursuit of comfort. In Africa where a head of the judiciary has
been honest enough to accept that corruption in his department "threatens
to reach a point of disgrace and uncontrollable destruction to the system,"' political clientelism and lack of accountability in the management
of the national and international drainage basins can prove fatal to the
organizations. The capacity of taxpayers to keep subsidizing the inefficient, wasteful, negligent and corrupt system is obviously finite.
In fact, every drainage basin development authority should work on
the basis of achievement targets set by their governing boards. Thereafter,
individual executives should retain jobs only on proof of achievement.
This rigorous ethic could be an effective part of accountability, and examples exist elsewhere, even though not in basin authorities. On Monday,
April 7, 1986, WeiYung-Wing, the chairman of the state-run China Ship
Building Corporation, resigned following his company's failure to com33. See a brief account by Francois Huot, Co-Operatives in Burkina Fasso: A Spirit of SelfDevelopment; and David Creighton, Lessons from India: Success, the Co-Operative Way, 15 The
IDRC Reports, No. I at 22 (1986).
34. Comments by Acting Chief Justice Madan of Kenya on Tuesday, Jan. 21, 1986, in an address
to the Coast Province Branch of the Law Society of Kenya. See report in Daily Nation (Nairobi),
Jan. 23, 1986, at 4, col. 4.
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plete on schedule two container ships ordered by a local firm. Financial
resources which African states often seek from donor agencies will hardly
insure development unless there is also impeccable commitment to achieve
public goals, honesty and integrity in the management of public resources,
and generally, a community-oriented entrepreneurship.
The point is that in order to succeed, African states must act firmly
and ensure accountability from their highest levels before they can expect
performance at the farmers' level. In the end, most of the productive
work should be done at the local level by the small-scale farmers, collaborating through their organizations or through the local commercial
enterprises.
Over-centralization of institutions and management tends to lead to
inefficiency; neglect and insensitivity to the farmers; destruction of the
morale and initiative of the actual producers; failure to stimulate the
participation of the producers and their organizations in procedural and
substantive ways; and eventually, the collapse of the programmes in
situations where accountability was already scanty.
The state operations may also devolve to the local level in the form
of autonomous but associated enterprises working as subsidiaries of the
parent institutions. The autonomy of the subsidiaries would cushion the
subsidiaries from the financial failures of the parent or sister enterprises
and, at the same time, permit the weak enterprises to collapse alone.
The decentralization and devolution of management to the local levels
should be accompanied by a systematic institution building to include
high level training of experts; training of extensionists; mobilization and
education of the farmers as individuals and within their organizations;
and the provision as well as maintenance of the basic infrastructure.
There is no substitute to institution building if the development programmes are to succeed. But as a requirement, the organization must be
able to train, attract and retain the managerial staff. It is not sufficient
simply to train: under the aegis of the Niger Basin Authority six persons
had been sent for training with assistance from USAID; four of them had
received master of science degrees by mid-1984 but none of them had
been employed by the Authority. That was also the Authority where the
head of one of the four operational departments" expressed frustration
at the fact that since his appointment in July 1981, the chief executive
had not even assigned him a single project by mid-1984. In fact, he
submitted, the chief executive had frustrated every initiative he had taken
to build up and execute a project.
35. The 1980 Act by which the contracting states established the Niger Basin Authority established
from Departments: Water Resources; Navigation- Transportation and Telecommunication; Agriculture; Fisheries and Livestock; Administration; Economy and Personnel; plus the Documentation
Centre.
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It is submitted here that efficient and effective management of the
demonstrably abundant resources of the African drainage basins holds a
critical key to the resolution of the current African economic problems.
This is the case because it would make available two factors behind
Africa's crises: indigenous energy resources and dependable agricultural
production. It is also certain that with the availability of agricultural
production and energy resources, a number of avenues for the transformation of the economic structure is possible beginning with agro-based
industries.
For these reasons researchers and policymakers, particularly from Africa, have the challenge of finding the formula for the eradication of the
problems of management, and the promotion of a rigorous social ethic
of accountability. This is not a sufficient condition, but it is an absolutely
necessary condition if development is to be realized.

